Misinformation and Kimochi
Kerr on the Failed Modernization of Japan
Interview by Catherine Pawasarat (from
Japanese version of Alex Kerr's first book, Lost Japan, won
Japan's Shincho Gakugei Prize for the year's best work of non-fiction,
while translations have already become a mainstay of literature on
contemporary Japan. That book was very much about feelings —
Kerr's feelings about Japan, Japanese people's feelings about their
In his new book, Dogs and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Modern
Japan, Kerr investigates the stark reality behind all those feelings.
Though still filled with passion for his erstwhile homeland, Dogs
and Demons reveals the heavy layers of rickety structure that
support contemporary Japan. The facts will not surprise those familiar
with this country: Kerr simply pulls back the curtain for us to see
the elaborate and embarrassing emperor's new clothes -kind of mechanisms
that are happening backstage, of which many Japan-watchers had glimpses
or intuitive understanding. What is more astonishing is the fact —
which Kerr also addresses — that the curtain has managed to stay down
for so long.
Kerr spoke with Kyoto-based writer Catherine Pawasarat on a recent
visit to Kyoto.
did the title of your new book, Dogs and Demons, come from?
Kerr: It's a Chinese story. The emperor asked the court painter, what's
easy and what's difficult to paint? He responded that demons are easy,
dogs are difficult. And what he meant was that the quiet, low-key
things in the environment are very hard to get right, but the grandiose,
imaginary statements are easy.
This book has been the hardest project I've ever done in my life,
but also one of the most fascinating, because I learned so much. When
I wrote Lost Japan, it was all just "kimochi" (feeling),
and I didn't really know any of the mechanisms. Now I really know
where the money comes from, who the planners are, why dams get built,
who manages them, etc.
The book is massively researched, facts and figures coming out of
my ears. The poor reader gets an awful lot of numbers, like how much
concrete Japan pours in a year — which, by the way, is 30 times the
world average per square foot. Why did I have to do this kind of detailed
research? For the credibility. It needed to be backed up so that people
living in foreign countries would realize that I'm not making it up!
Part of it is a PC issue, I think we're all taught that we're not
supposed to criticize other cultures. That's why I think it's so important
for the readers of this book to realize that it's not just another
foreign criticizing Japan — I am expressing the voice of the Japanese
do you mean?
is a book that gives voice to the Japanese who feel exactly as I do,
and who exist by the millions. Japanese bookshelves are filled with
angry books all of on these subjects. But all of this stuff is in
Japanese, it doesn't get into the foreign press, because the Japanese
are writing it for themselves. A huge amount of what I write, these
are Japanese making these comments, not me. There are hundreds of
Japanese quoted in this book.
does the dogs and demons concept relate to Japan, specifically?
Japan, you'll find the dogs and demons problem across the board. For
example, you'll find it in finance: instead of making the fundamental
changes that will reinvigorate finance, colorful surface statements
are made. And the combination of demons is now driving this country
into serious debt. That's one subject in the book: this country
is now riddled with debt, it's the most indebted nation in the world,
by far. America's national debt as a percentage of our GNP reached
its height some years back at 65%, while the worse cases in Europe
are Italy, France, and Belgium, which are up above 100% of GNP, nearing
110%, I think. So Japan is at 130% and skyrocketing. And it's to support
the demons, to support absurd and outrageous spending.
Why do we get demons? Because the bureaucracy truly
doesn't have a clue anymore what culture, city planning and the arts
are. But they feel duty-bound to do something. So they come up with
this book focus a lot on finance?
as one part of the whole picture. I begin the book talking about what
happened to the environment, then finance. Then I go on to talk about
a number of different subjects that appear to be unrelated, but are
in fact closely related: the bureaucracy, old cities, new cities,
education, ikebana, cinema and internationalization.
I have a chapter on information, which I think is the first ever in
English, by anybody, on how Japan handles information. That is a critically
important subject that relates to Japan's failure to become a modern
state, which is another central theme in the book.
When information is hidden, lied about, mishandled etc. — as it is
routinely in this country, from top to bottom — then you have a big
problem from a modern technology point of view. That's why nuclear
plants are failing, that's why milk isn't treated properly anymore.
In America, hiding information is always a big mistake. In America,
you get sued. In Japan, there are no penalties — no one ever sues,
no one ever questions. Here, hiding information has been "for everybody's
know that nuclear accident that happened? The nuclear plant employees
were mixing nuclear material in a bucket!
the trouble is that lying doesn't fit in with modern technology. It
just doesn't. And then you come into serious problems like whole
towns, hundreds of thousands of people needing to be evacuated because
of a nuclear fission accident. "Little" things like that begin to
happen once you have lied and hidden and disguised it too long.
One would feel better if one thought that there were all-knowing
bureaucrats with secret files in which they kept the truth, even though
they might be covering it up. The fact is that the ministries themselves
have lost track. They wouldn't know anymore where the dioxins really
are. They wouldn't know anymore which hospitals are consistently doing
malpractice and which ones are treating patients properly. They wouldn't
know anymore, for example, which drugs are efficacious, because Japan
doesn't have a drug protocol for testing. The purpose of that is to
protect Japanese pharmaceutical companies so they can make copy-cat
medicine and sell them to the Japanese public, even though it might
have side effects.
At the moment this is happening in finance as well. It's perfectly
clear that the Finance Ministry at this point really doesn't know
where the bad debts are, because it was all hidden so well, with the
Finance Ministry's own connivance. Now they have a terrible problem,
and really they don't know anymore. That applies to many, many fields.
Like toxic waste. To this day you don't have to report the amount
of toxic waste that you're dumping or where you're dumping it. After
that goes on long enough, the Environment Ministry wouldn't have any
idea where the toxic waste is. So Japan has reached a scary point
where the people in charge no longer know the real problems of their
own ministries. The hard facts that they need to make clear decisions
are not available.
This is not what I'd call an efficient managing of a modern state.
That brings us to the question — central to my book — of whether or
not Japan is modernized. I would say no. If the Health Ministry
doesn't know what really qualifies as an effective drug, if the Environment
Ministry doesn't have a clue about where the toxic waste is buried,
if the Finance Ministry really doesn't know where the bad debts are,
we are not talking "efficient modern administration." It's the sort
of thing you would expect of a banana republic. It's not what you
would expect out of Japan. And yet it's the reality. It's a fascinating
subject. It was later in the process of the book that this issue of
information began to appear, and I began to realize how important
For historical reasons, it's almost a knee-jerk reaction to see Japan
as "modern this, modern that." My argument is that Japan is a FAILED
case of modernization, that essentially modern technologies froze
here somewhere between 1965 and 1970, and that in one single area,
which was manufacturing, Japan continued — and even then at a slowed-down
pace — to absorb technologies from abroad. But in every other area,
it failed to acquire the technologies that are the mark of a modern
what kind of technologies?
how to run a hospital. How to run a zoo. How to run a museum. How
to run a luxury resort, in fact, how to run a hotel, period. The hotel
business here, it's a shambles. How to design: roads, retaining walls,
and how to design new cities. These are very sophisticated modern
technologies, and ones which this country lacks.
One of the fascinating aspects of all this is that Japan can fight
it and fight it. But change is here! Reality is knocking on the door.
How Japan is going to deal with reality is the issue, but whether
reality will make itself felt, I have not a doubt. Certain sectors
are going to be internationalized, like it or not. One way or another,
politically, the bureaucracy, the educational system, the industrial
infrastructure, it is all going to change, it has GOT to change. How,
and to what degree, and how fast, and whether it changes enough to
make a difference, those are things that no one can predict.
But Japan cannot go on, I don't feel, as it is now. The strain is
just huge. Which is good. Change may save this place. That's what
we hope for, that's why I've written this book. If enough people look
at the boondoggle public works demons, and say, "This is horrible,
stop it!" then they will.
I don't foresee a big political movement, that's not the way things
change here. Again, it's "kimochi." If there's enough kimochi out
there, then with amazing speed it will change. Once the kimochi
has begun to change, it's amazing, the speed with which this country
can make changes.
So this book is a contribution to the kimochi.
English version of Dogs and Demons was published in March
2001. The Japanese version, written by Kerr in Japanese, was published
in summer of 2001. Illustration above by Thierry LE...